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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, several developed countries have begun to rise concerns over the continuous
growth of international migration ﬂows. Despite the academic literature has so far found limited
eﬀects of immigration on native citizens welfare, international migration is now at the heart of
public debates and selective migration policies are proliferating worldwide in order to protect
national employment and welfare.
Between 2000 and 2017, the increase in the foreign-born population accounted for almost
three-quarters of the total population increase in EU/EFTA countries, and for more than one-
third of the increase in the United States.1 Such demographic changes are reshaping the host
countries workforce composition and underline the importance of taking into account intergener-
ational aspects concerning young and older individuals when assessing for the eﬀects of migration
on the host countries. Indeed, as migration ﬂows keep changing the host country labor force
composition, in the long-run younger natives may respond to immigration by upgrading their
skills and specializing in diﬀerent production tasks. Further, another interesting aspect which
is often debated, but rarely taken into account when evaluating the immigration surplus, is
that most developed countries are aging, while migration ﬂows are usually characterized by
young workers looking for new job opportunities. Given that intergenerational transfers in high-
income countries are large, immigrant workers could play a considerable role in alleviating the
ﬁscal burden that aging populations will face in the next decades.
This paper aims to contribute to the limited but growing literature regarding the impact
of immigration through search and matching models, by introducing two major features that
characterize the long-run equilibrium. First, we allow young natives that enter the labor market
to endogenously adjust their skill in face of migration, so that the skill composition of the
migration ﬂows inﬂuence the natives education decisions in the long-run. Second, we distinguish
between young and retired workers, who receive diﬀerent public transfers according to their age,
skill and origin. This feature allows to better assess the ﬁscal impact of migration, as natives and
immigrants are characterized by diﬀerent age composition and social welfare usage. To the best
of our knowledge, no previous paper has developed a theoretical model able to analyze long-run
eﬀects of migration on natives welfare by taking into account unemployment issues, endogenous
skill acquirement, and ﬁscal redistribution among diﬀerent generations.2
Focusing on a selected group of 19 OECD countries, we calibrate and simulate the search
model under three diﬀerent scenarios: (a) an increase in low-skilled migration equal to 1 percent
of the total labor force; (b) an increase of the same size of high-skilled migration; (c) an increase
of the same size of immigrants, keeping their skill composition constant. The obtained results are
then compared to the cases in which the natives skill is exogenous and/or the retired population
is not taken into account. Our quantitative analysis generates the following main results. First,
when skill acquisition is endogenous, young natives are eﬀectively able to avoid any potential
displacement eﬀect under scenarios (b) and (c), in most of the analyzed countries. When the
1Source: OECD (2018).
2Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), in one of their extensions, analyze the case in which natives endogenously
adjust their skill, but they completely abstract from the presence of a public sector.
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immigration shock consists only of low-skilled workers (scenario (a)), native unemployment
slightly increases in most countries, but native average wages noticeably increase in all of the
19 countries. Second, we ﬁnd that taking into account the age composition of the population
plays a key role in determining the ﬁscal impact of immigration. In particular, we ﬁnd that the
ﬁscal impact of skill-balanced and high-skilled immigration is positive for most countries when
we distinguish between active and retired workers in the economy. Conversely, when abstracting
from retired individuals, the ﬁscal impact of immigration is found to be mostly negative for all
of the three analyzed scenarios. Third, in almost all of the considered countries, incorporating
endogenous natives skill acquisition and age composition yields more optimistic welfare results
than a standard search model that neglects both of these features. In particular, under our
model, we ﬁnd that skill-balanced and high-skilled migration shocks increse the average native
welfare on almost most countries, while low-skilled immigration is found to be beneﬁcial to
natives welfare on 9 out of the 19 considered OECD countries.
This study is related to at least three strands of literature. First, it is related to the stream
of literature that focuses on the eﬀect of migration on the natives skill composition and spe-
cialization. While most of this literature is empirical and ﬁnds mixed results on the eﬀects on
natives high-school completion rate (see, e.g., Betts, 1998; Hunt, 2012), a number of papers have
recently focused on the immigration eﬀects on natives task specialization. These latter studies
include Peri and Sparber (2009, 2011) and D'Amuri and Peri (2014) who, analyzing whether
natives move to more complex jobs as a consequence of immigration, ﬁnd that natives may
respond to immigration by changing their specialization. Cattaneo et al. (2013) ﬁnd that native
Europeans are more likely to upgrade to more skilled and better paid occupations when a larger
number of immigrants enter their labor market. McHenry (2015) ﬁnds that low-skilled immi-
gration induces natives to improve their performance in school, attain more years of schooling,
and take jobs that involve communication-intensive tasks, potentially mitigating the negative
eﬀects of immigration on the labor market.
Second, this paper is related to the recent stream of the migration literature that analyzes the
impacts of immigration through a framework that allows for labor market search frictions. This
literature includes Ortega (2000), Liu (2010), Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), Chassambouli
and Peri (2015), Liu et al. (2017) and Battisti et al. (2018). In particular, our paper is closely
related to Battisti et al. (2018), who employ a setup with search and matching frictions in order
to assess the welfare eﬀects of immigration on 20 OECD countries. Their quantitative analysis
suggests that immigration attenuates the eﬀects of search frictions by boosting ﬁrms' proﬁts
and generating a job creation eﬀect which, in turn, oﬀsets the welfare costs of ﬁscal redistribu-
tion. However, as pointed out by these authors, their analysis abstracts from intergenerational
transfers and population aging, so that the ﬁscal eﬀect of migration could diﬀerently impact on
government balance and welfare. Moreover, they assume that all workers' skill level is exogenous,
so their analysis does not allow natives to update their skill in response of skill-biased migration
shocks.
Last, our paper also relates to that strand of the migration literature that focuses on the
ﬁscal eﬀects of immigration. Storesletten (2000, 2003) ﬁnds that new immigrants represent, on
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average, a positive gain for the ﬁscal balances of U.S. and Sweden. Dustmann and Frattini (2014)
ﬁnd a noticeable positive ﬁscal contribution from recent immigrants, especially those originating
from EEA countries. However, aside from Battisti et al. (2018), this literature mainly focuses on
an account approach without considering labor market interactions between migrant and native
workers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides stylized facts on labor
market characteristics and population composition of the 19 analyzed OECD countries. Section
3 introduces the benchmark version of the model and characterizes the search equilibrium.
Section 4 describes the calibration procedure used to simulate the model and discusses the
results. Finally, Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Stylized facts
In OECD countries, 127 million people were foreign-born in 2017, which represents an average
of 13% of the total population compared with 9.5% in 2000.3 We use the Database on Immi-
grants in OECD countries (DIOC) described by Arslan et al. (2014) to account for diﬀerences
in demographic characteristics, level of education, and labor market status of the population of
the 19 selected OECD countries. In particular, we focus on the census round 2010, extracting
information about the country of origin, age, educational attainment and labor market status
of immigrants residing in 19 selected OECD countries (the 15 members of the European Union,
Australia, Canada, Switzerland and US).
Figure 1 below compares labor market status, education level and age composition of immi-
grant and native residents in the analyzed countries.
Figure 1a displays the amount of immigrant workers of age 2564 participating to the labor
force, as a share of the total work force of the same age in the analyzed OECD countries. In 17
out of the 19 countries (all but Denmark and Finland), the share of immigrant workers is higher
than 11%, with Luxembourg being the OECD country that relies the most on migrant workers
(about 50% of its labor force is foreign-born). The average is 18% and the standard deviation
is 10%.
Figure 1b shows that, on average, immigrants suﬀer from a higher unemployment rate (12.9%
for immigrants versus 9.7% for natives). In particular, 16 out of 19 countries (all but Ireland, US
and Canada) are characterized by a higher unemployment rate for immigrant workers, though the
correlation between immigrant and native unemployment is extremely high (91.3%). However,
it is noteworthy that in some countries the diﬀerence in unemployment rates is quite substantial.
In Spain, immigrant workers suﬀer an unemployment rate almost 10 percent points higher than
natives, while in Austria, Netherlands and Sweden the migrant unemployment rate is more than
twice as high as the native one.
As far as skill composition is concerned, Figure 1c illustrates the share of immigrant and
native workers with at least one year of college education or a bachelor degree (ISCED 5). Despite
the correlation between native- and foreign-born is high (65.7%) and, on average, immigrants and
3Source: OECD (2018)
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Figure 1: Labor market and population characteristics
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Note: Figure 1 shows population characteristics for 19 selected countries: the 15 members states of the European Union (EU15), Australia, Canada, Switzerland and US.
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natives have a similar share of college educated workers (33% for immigrants, 35.4% for natives),
some countries still present a sharp diﬀerence in skill composition between the immigrant and
native workers  particularly in Belgium, where the share of college educated natives is almost
twice as high as that of college educated immigrants.
Heterogeneity in countries wage premiums are underlined in Figure 1d. Data on wage ratios
between native and immigrant workers are obtained from Buchel and Frick (2005) and Docquier
et al. (2014), while average returns to skill are taken from OECD (2012) data. In almost all
countries, natives earn more than immigrant workers. In Section 3, we follow Ottaviano and
Peri (2012) and interpret this stylized fact as a result of imperfect substituability in production
between immigrant and native workers.4 Finally, a consistent education wage premium is present
in most countries, with college-educated workers earning more than twice as much as lesser-
educated ones in 7 out of 19 countries.
3 The model
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of risk-neutral agents, who discount
the future at a constant rate r > 0 and are heterogeneous under three respects. First, agents
diﬀer in their origin country, so that they can either be native or foreign-born individuals who
immigrated in the domestic economy. Second, agents are characterized by diﬀerent education
attainments. Following the bulk of the literature that identiﬁes education based-skills (e.g. Card,
2009; Docquier et al., 2014; Battisti et al., 2018), throughout the paper we will refer to college
graduates as high-skilled individuals, and to less educated as low-skilled individuals. Third,
individuals of all origins are assumed to be either in their working age or retired. Young active
individuals supply labor in order to be employed and earn a wage, while retirees are unable (or
unwilling) to enter the labor market, so that their only income derives from government transfers
and capital market. For simplicity, all agents in the economy are assumed to born and retire at
the same rate ν. Moreover, in each time period t, the number of deaths equal the number of
births, so that the population sizes of young and retired agents are constant over time.
As far as production is concerned, intermediate ﬁrms open vacancies in a frictional labor
market in order to hire workers and produce intermediate goods. At the same time, retail ﬁrms
buy these intermediate goods in order to produce and sell a homogeneous ﬁnal good in a per-
fectly competitive market. Finally, the government taxes labor income to ﬁnance redistributive
transfers, public consumption, and unemployment beneﬁts. For easy of exposition, the time
variable t is omitted whereas no confusion arises.
In Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, we describe the production technology and the frictional labor
market that characterizes the economy. We then illustrate the skill acquisition process and the
government ﬁscal redistribution in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4. Finally, the search equilibrium
is characterized in Section 3.5.
4Multiple determinants may also inﬂuence the native wage premium, such as imperfect transferability of
human capital (Poutvaara, 2008), or discrimination (Bartolucci, 2014). We later perform a sensitive analysis to
take into account the case in which immigrant and native workers are perfect substitutes in production.
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3.1 Production
In the small open economy, retail ﬁrms employ physical capital K and a composite input good Z
in order to produce a homogeneous ﬁnal output Y , whose price is normalized to unity, according
to the following Cobb-Douglas production function
Y = AKαZ1−α, (1)
where A > 0 is a given parameter capturing the level of TFP, and α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of
capital income in total output.
At the same time, the composite input Z is produced by intermediate ﬁrms who employ
young individuals of heterogeneous skill and origin country. Let Eos denote employed workers
in the labor market, where the subscript o = (n,m) refers to natives and immigrants, and
the subscript s = (h, l) refers to high- and low-skilled individuals. As standard in this strand
of literature (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2002), we assume that each intermediate ﬁrm employs at
most one worker, so that the number of intermediate goods, Yos, and employed workers, Eos,
coincide in each point in time t. Hence, following recent studies (such as Manacorda et al.,
2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012) that ﬁnd imperfect substituability between native and migrant
workers, the production technology used to assemble the composite input Z can be described
by the following nested CES function
Z =
[
xY
(σ1−1)/σ1
h + (1− x)Y (σ1−1)/σ1l
]σ1/(σ1−1)
(2)
Ys =
[
λY (σ2−1)/σ2ns + (1− λ)Y (σ2−1)/σ2ms
]σ2/(σ2−1)
, s = (h, l),
where σ1 and σ2 are, respectively, the elasticity of substitution between skill groups and between
origin groups, x ∈ (0, 1) denotes the relative productivity of high-skilled compared to low-skilled,
and λ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the relative productivity of native workers compared to immigrants.
Because intermediate goods are produced under perfect competition, their price, pos, equals
their marginal productivity
pmh = A(1− α)x(1− λ)KαZ
1−ασ1
σ1 Y
− 1
σ1
h
(
Yh
Ymh
) 1
σ2
(3a)
pml = A(1− α)(1− x)(1− λ)KαZ
1−ασ1
σ1 Y
− 1
σ1
l
(
Yl
Yml
) 1
σ2
(3b)
pnh = A(1− α)xλKαZ
1−ασ1
σ1 Y
− 1
σ1
h
(
Yh
Ynh
) 1
σ2
(3c)
pnl = A(1− α)(1− x)λKαZ
1−ασ1
σ1 Y
− 1
σ1
l
(
Yl
Ynl
) 1
σ2
. (3d)
Finally, capital in the economy is free to be perfectly mobile and, because the domestic economy
is assumed to be small compared to the outside world, the return on capital r is ﬁxed by
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international markets. Hence, the total amount of physical capital in the economy will adjust
so to satisfy the usual ﬁrst order condition
r = AαKα−1Z1−α. (4)
3.2 Labor market
Each intermediate ﬁrm opens a vacancy for either high-skilled or low-skilled workers. Following
Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) and Battisti et al. (2018), we assume that ﬁrms are not able
to discriminate between immigrant and native workers at the vacancy posting stage, so that job
vacancies Vs and unemployed individuals Us ≡
∑
o
Uos are randomly matched with each other
according to the following Cobb-Douglas matching function
M(Us, Vs) = ξU

sV
1−
s , s = (h, l), (5)
where M is the number of job matches, ξ is a constant matching eﬃciency parameter, and
 ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity parameter of the matching function.
Let θS ≡ Vs/Us denote the labor market tightness in the skill sector s. The job ﬁnding rate is
given byMs/Us = ξθ
1− ≡ m(θs), and the vacancy ﬁlling rate is given byMs/Vs = ξθ− ≡ q(θs).
As it easy to verify, m(θs) and q(θs) are, respectively, increasing and decreasing in θs, implying
that a higher market tightness makes it more diﬃcult for ﬁrms to ﬁll a vacancy, but easier for
unemployed workers to ﬁnd a job.
Asset value functions
Let J o,Fs and J Vs denote the value associated with a ﬁlled and unﬁlled vacancy, respectively.5
Then, their ﬂow value in steady-state is given by
rJ o,Fs = pos − wos − (δos + ν)
[J o,Fs − J Vs ] (6)
rJ Vs = −cs + q(θs)
[
(1− φs)J n,Fs + φsJm,Fs − J Vs
]
, (7)
where cs is the ﬁxed cost of an open vacancy for a worker of skill level s, φs ≡ Ums/Us is
the share of unemployed immigrants among all searching individuals of skill type s, and δos is
the exogenous separation rate, which is allowed to diﬀer for workers' skills and country origin.
Equation (6) states that the asset value of a ﬁlled vacancy is given by the price at which the
intermediate input is sold, minus the wage rate paid to employed workers, and the expected
value of breaking up with an employed worker, multiplied by the probability that such an event
occurs, δos + ν.
6 Equation (7) has a similar interpretation, as it states that the asset value of
having an unﬁlled vacancy is given by the vacancy cost,−cs, plus the expected value of ﬁlling a
5Note that the value of an open vacancy, J Vs , has no origin index o because ﬁrms are unable to direct their
search towards diﬀerent types of workers who hold the same skill level.
6Remind that a worker will separate from a ﬁrm at a rate δos+ ν, rather than δos, because he will not supply
work after retirement.
7
vacancy, which occurs at a probability q(θs).
For working-age individuals who supply labor, the steady-state discounted present value of
employment, J o,Es , and unemployment, J o,Us , are given by
rJ o,Es = (1− τ)wos + δos
[J o,Us − J o,Es ]+ ν [J Ros − J Eos]+ T yos + rk (8)
rJ o,Us = bos +m (θs)
[J o,Es − J o,Us ]+ ν [J Ros − J Uos]+ T yos + rk, (9)
where τ is the labor income tax rate, T yos are redistributive transfers to young workers of origin
o and skill s, rk is the per capita capital income, and J Ros is the steady-state value of retirement
which is deﬁned later on in the paper. According to equation (8), the ﬂow value of being employed
equals the diﬀerence between the after-tax wage income and the expected loss from breaking-up
from the ﬁrm, plus transfers, T yos, capital income, rk, and the expected gain from becoming a
retiree, ν
[J Ros − J Eos]. Likewise, equation (9) states that the ﬂow value of unemployment equals
its return, i.e. the unemployment beneﬁt bos, plus the probability of ﬁnding a job, multiplied
by the expected gain from such event, transfers, capital income and the expected gain from
retirement.
Finally, letting Ros denote the number of retired workers of type (o, s), the ﬂow value of
being a retired worker in steady-state, J Ros , can be written as
rJ Ros = TRos + rk − gJ Ros , (10)
where TRos are redistributive transfers paid to retired workers and g ≡ νQos/Ros is the share of
retirees that die at each time period t.7
Job creation condition
As intermediate ﬁrms are in perfect competition and bare no costs of entry, they will ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to enter the market as long as the value of posting a new vacancy is greater than zero.
In steady-state, the free entry condition is thus given by
J Vs = 0. (11)
Combining equations (6), (7) and (11), in steady-state the job creation condition reads
cs
q (θs)
= (1− φs)
[
pns − wns
r + ν + δns
]
+ φs
[
pms − wms
r + ν + δms
]
. (12)
Equation (12) states that the expected cost of creating a vacancy, cs/q (θs), is equal to the
expected beneﬁt of ﬁlling a vacancy with either a native or immigrant worker, pos−wos, adjusted
by the worker-type speciﬁc discount rate, r + ν + δos. Note that a higher market tightness θs
7Note that, in each time period t, a mass of workers ν
∑
o
∑
s
Qos retire and, at the same time, the same number
of retirees die. This implies that the total number of retirees is constant over time and the ratio νQos/Ros is
always within (0, 1).
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translates to higher vacancy opening costs, since the waiting time for ﬁlling a vacancy is is
increasing in θs.
Wage determination
Following mainstream search and matching literature, once a match between a worker and a
vacancy has been formed, ﬁrms and workers bargain over wages. Let β ∈ (0, 1) denote the
worker bargaining power. The solution of the bargaining problem is then given by the wage rate
wos that satisﬁes
(1− β) (J o,Es − J o,Us ) = β (J o,Fs − J Vs ) .
Combining the asset value equations (6)-(9) and considering the free entry condition (11), the
bargained wage rate paid to workers of type (o, s) is given by
wos =
β [r + ν + δos +m (θs)] pos
(r + ν + δos) [1− (1− β) (τ + µ)] + βm (θs) , (13)
where the unemployment beneﬁt bos has been endogenized and proportionally set to the wage
rate, i.e. bos ≡ µwos, with µ ∈ (0, 1) denoting the replacement rate. According to equation (13),
higher worker bargaining power β translates to higher wage rates. It is also easy to check that
the bargained wage rate wos is increasing in the replacement rate µ. This is coherent with the
intuition that higher values of replacement rate would increase the worker's outside option and,
thus, the worker's surplus from hiring.
Employment
The dynamic law of employed workers of skill s and origin o is given by the diﬀerence between
the amount of matches formed and the break-ups that take place in a given instant of time t;
that is
E˙os = m (θs)Uos − (δos + ν)Eos. (14)
Denoting with Qos ≡ Eos + Uos the total amount of active individuals of type (o, s), the total
amount of employed and unemployed people in steady-state can be written as
Eos =
m (θs)Qos
δos + ν +m (θs)
(15)
Uos =
(δos + ν)Qos
δos + ν +m (θs)
. (16)
Based on equations (15) and (16), for any given size of the active population Qos, employment
increases in the job ﬁnding probability, m(θs), and decreases in the separation rate, δos.
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3.3 Skill acquisition
Before entering the labor market, each young native individual decides whether to invest in
education and become high-skilled or remain low-skilled. Following Chassamboulli and Palivos
(2014), agents diﬀer in their cost of acquiring education and, in particular, older agents are
assumed to face prohibitive costs that make them prevent from investing in training. Let z
denote the cost of acquiring training and assume that it is distributed uniformly over the closed
interval [0, z¯]. A native young agent will invest in education if the beneﬁt of looking for a job
as high-skilled, rather than as low-skilled, exceeds the cost of acquiring training, that is
J Unh − J Unl ≥ z. (17)
Setting (17) as an equality, there exists a threshold value for the training cost
z∗ = J Unh − J Unl , (18)
such that agents will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in education and become high-skilled. From
equation (17), it follows that the fraction of native high-skilled workers, γ ≡ Qnh/(Qnh +Qnl),
is thus endogenously determined by the model and equals
γ =
z∗
z¯
. (19)
Plugging equation (9) into (17), and then using equation (8), the steady-state share of native
high-skilled workers γ reads
γ =
µ (wnh − wnl) + T ynh − T ynl +m (θh)
[
wnh(1−τ−µ)
r+ν+δnh+m(θh)
]
−m (θl)
[
wnl(1−τ−µ)
r+ν+δnl+m(θl)
]
z¯ (r + ν)
. (20)
It is worth noting that, since young individuals eventually age and become retired, a change in
young natives skill composition implies a change in retired skill composition as well, so that, in
steady-state, the ratio Rnh/Rnl always matches the ratio Qnh/Qnl.
3.4 Government
The government imposes a ﬁxed tax rate τ ∈ (0, 1) on labor income in order to ﬁnance un-
employment beneﬁts µwos, and group speciﬁc transfers T
a
os, where the superscript a = (y,R)
denotes young and retired individuals.8 Assuming that the government conducts a zero proﬁt
policy, the government budget constraint writes
τ
∑
o
∑
s
wos = µ
∑
o
∑
s
Uoswos +
∑
o
∑
s
QosT
y
os +
∑
o
∑
s
RosT
R
os. (21)
8As in Burzynski et al. (2018), T aos includes redistributive transfers that vary across origin and skill types, as
well as public consumption which is assumed to be identical across all individuals.
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The left-hand side of equation (21) corresponds to the government revenues, whereas the right-
hand side corresponds to the government expenditures. The income tax τ is assumed to endoge-
nously adjusts to balance the government budget, so that when a temporary deﬁcit (surplus)
takes place, the government responses by raising (decreasing) τ .
3.5 Search equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1. A steady-state equilibrium is a set of equilibrium values {pos,K, θs, wos, Eos , Uos,
γ, τ}, where o = (n,m) and s = (h, l), such that: (i) the intermediate inputs market clear, so
that equations (3a)-(3d) are satisﬁed; (ii) capital markets clear, so that equation (4) is satisﬁed;
(iii) the job creation condition (12) for each skill type s is satisﬁed; (iv) The Nash bargaining
optimality condition (13) holds for each origin o and skill type s; (v) the numbers of employed
and unemployed workers are given by equations (15) and (16) for each origin o and skill type
s; (vi) the skill acquisition condition (20) is satisﬁed; (vii) the government sustains a no-deﬁcit
policy and its budget (21) is balanced.
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section we assess the impact of immigration on welfare, labor market outcomes and ﬁscal
redistribution in 19 selected OECD countries through a comparative statics analysis. More
speciﬁcally, we analyze both the cases of skill-biased and -unbiased migration shocks taking
place in the described economy. Throughout the analysis, we will refer to the welfare level of
natives by taking into account the following welfare index9
Wn ≡
∑
s
EnsJ Ens +
∑
s
UnsJ Uns − z
∗
2 Qnh +
∑
s
RnsJ Rns∑
s
(Qns +Rns)
, (22)
where z
∗
2 is the (endogenous) average cost of acquiring skill.
10 The welfare index Wn includes
the whole ﬂows of native labor income, capital income, unemployment beneﬁts, transfers and
cost for training.
The remainder of this Section is presented as follows. Section 4.1 explains the calibration
strategy for the benchmark model. Section 4.2 shows the results obtained and compares them
with diﬀerent variations of the model. Finally, Section 4.3 provides a robustness check on the
results to the parameters choice.
9Using this welfare index is equivalent of using the welfare index proposed by Battisti et al. (2018) when the
skill decision is exogenous and the population size is static. For the sake of exposition, in this section we will refer
to the immigration eﬀects on welfare only for the natives group. Appendix A shows the eﬀects on immigrants
welfare, as well as on speciﬁc workers groups.
10Recall that native workers are heterogenous with respect to their cost of training and that z in uniformly
distributed. This implies that the average cost payed by natives to acquire skill is z
∗
2
, and the total training cost
is z
∗
2
Qnh.
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4.1 Parametrization
We parametrize the described model in order to match the economic and socio-demographic
characteristics of 19 OECD countries (EU15 member states, Australia, Canada, Switzerland
and USA).
The described model includes a total of 32 exogenous parameters which need to be calibrated
in order to perform a quantitative analysis. Most of these parameters vary across countries and
are set to match moments taken from data, while some are assumed to be country-invariant
and taken from the empirical literature. Because the following analysis focuses on steady-state
variations, all scale parameters which do not aﬀect the results  namely, the TFP level A and
the matching eﬃciency ξ  are, for simplicity, normalized to unity in all countries.
Data sources used to calibrate country speciﬁc variables. As anticipated in Section
2, we use the DIOC data to account for diﬀerent demographic characteristics over the 19 OECD
countries. These data cover the census round 2010 and document the structure of the population
by country of origin, age, education level, and labor market status. As in Aubry et al. (2016),
we consider the share of population aged 65 and over as retired and out of the labor force, while
individuals aged 25 to 64, or that did not report their age, as the working aged group.11 Further,
individuals that have at least one year of college education or a bachelor degree are regarded
as high-skilled, whereas those with no education, with pre-primary, primary or secondary edu-
cation completed, or that did not report their education level, are deﬁned as the less-educated.
Following Burzynski et al. (2018), data on the wage ratio between college-educated and less
educated workers are taken from the Education at Glance 2012 report of the OECD, and used
as a proxy for the average return to skill wh/wl. Data on the wage ratio between native and
immigrant workers are instead obtained from Buchel and Frick (2005) and from Docquier et al.
(2014).
As far as the ﬁscal characteristics of the 19 OECD countries are concerned, comparable
aggregate data on public ﬁnances are obtained from the Annual National Accounts harmonized
by the OECD. In line with Burzynski et al. (2018), we use it to identify the redistributive
transfers T aos and the ratio of public expenditure to GDP. We also identify the amount of public
consumption and treat it as a homogeneous transfer to all residents (as a part of T aos). As
in Aubry et al. (2016), we also use the Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) of the OECD
to decompose social protection expenditures, and the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, provided by Eurostat) to disaggregate education and social
protection transfers received by the natives; transfers to natives are then identiﬁed by education
level and by age group.
Calibration of common parameters. Table 1 reports exogenous parameters without
country variation. We set the capital share parameter α = 0.33 to match the empirical evidence
of Gollin (2002). Following Ottaviano and Peri (2012), we choose the elasticity of substitution
between skill groups and origin groups of, respectively, σ1 = 2 and σ2 = 20. In line with
11Note that the DIOC data do not distinguish retirees by origin country. Following Burzynski et al. (2018), we
assume that retirees origin distribution follows the same proportion of the younger individuals, i.e. Rn/Rm ≡∑
s
Qns/
∑
s
Qms.
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Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) and Battisti et al. (2018), the monthly interest rate r is set to
0.4%. Further, we choose the matching elasticity parameter  = 0.5, which is within the range of
estimates reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), and
the bargaining power β = 0.5, so that the Hosios condition is met (see Hosios, 1990). Finally, we
normalize the low-skilled vancancy cost κl to the same value adopted in Battisti et al. (2018).
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Table 1: Parameters without country variation
Parameters Description Value Source
α Capital share 0.33 Gollin (2002)
σ1 Elast. subst. between skills 2 Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
σ2 Elast. subst. immig/natives 20 Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
κl Low-skilled vacancy cost 0.5 Battisti et al. (2018)
r Interest rate (monthly) 0.004 Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
 Matching elasticity 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
β Worker bargaining power 0.5 Hosios (1990)
Calibration of country-speciﬁc parameters. Exogenous parameters varying across
countries are listed in Table 2. The parameters x and λ are calibrated to match, respectively,
the average return to skill wh/wl and the average native wage premium wn/wm. The separation
rates δos are set to match the unemployment rates observed in the DIOC data. Speciﬁcally,
separation rates are calibrated to be, on average, larger for migrants than for natives, since
migrant workers are generally characterized by a higher unemployment rate. The vacancy ratio
κh/κl is parameterized to match the wage ratio wh/wl, implying that it is more costly to have
a high-skilled unﬁlled vacancy, rather than a low-skilled one, proportionately to the education
wage premium. The upper bound parameter related to the cost of acquiring education, z¯, is set
in order to match the share of high-skilled natives provided by DIOC data.
As far as ﬁscal parameters are concerned, the replacement rate µ matches the observed share
of unemployment beneﬁts in GDP. Further, we calibrate the level of public transfers so to match
the government expenditure to GDP as well as transfers by diﬀerent cohorts taken from the
OECD Annual National Accounts database.
Finally, we normalize the total young workers population to one and parametrize the shares
of total retirees by origin (Rm ≡
∑
s
Rms and Rn ≡
∑
s
Rns) and young immigrants by skill (Qmh
and Qml) according to DIOC data.
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Using this parameters calibration, in the following section we simulate marginal increases
in diﬀerent types of migration ﬂows taking, as reference, the described moments as the status
quo.14
12As pointed out in Battisti et al. (2018), this is a normalization that does not aﬀect the obtained results.
13Note that the total number of retirees by origin is exogenous, but the number of retirees by origin and skill
is endogenous (e.g. Rnh ≡ Rnγ).
14Although we cannot obtain a closed-form solution for our model, we ﬁnd that, under the described
parametrization, a unique economically meaningful equilibrium exists in all the considered countries for the
benchmark model.
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Table 2: Parameters varying across countries
Parameters Description Mean S.d. Moment matched
Labor market parameters
x Firms' preference to HS 0.521 0.038 Avg. return to skill wh/wl
λ Firms' preference to natives 0.592 0.054 Avg. wage ratio wn/wm
δnh Break-up rate of HS natives 0.064 0.044 Unempl. rate Unh/Qnh
δnl Break-up rate of LS natives 0.072 0.052 Unempl. rate Unl/Qnl
δmh Break-up rate of HS immigrants 0.07 0.046 Unempl. rate Umh/Qmh
δml Break-up rate of LS immigrants 0.113 0.075 Unempl. rate Uml/Qml
κh/κl Vacancy costs ratio 1.98 0.36 Avg. return to skill wh/wl
z¯ Training cost (compared to US) 0.835 0.442 Share of HS native workers γ
Fiscal parameters
µ Replacement rate 0.4 0.11 OECD data
T ynh Transfers to natives HS 0.194 0.047 Gov. exp./GDP
T ynl/T
y
nh Transfers ratio NL/NH 0.938 0.163 OECD data
T ymh/T
y
nh Transfers ratio MH/NH 1, 365 0.453 OECD data
T yml/T
y
nh Transfers ratio ML/NH 1.276 0.438 OECD data
T rnh/T
y
nh Transfers ratio ret. NH/NH 2.486 0.984 OECD data
T rnl/T
y
nh Transfers ratio ret. NL/NH 1.748 0.489 OECD data
T rmh/T
y
nh Transfers ratio ret. MH/NH 2.367 0.889 OECD data
T rml/T
y
nh Transfers ratio ret. ML/NH 1.908 0.788 OECD data
Demograﬁc sizes (native workers population normalized to unity)
Qymh Young migrants HS 0.09 0.088 OECD data
Qyml Young migrants LS 0.162 0.138 OECD data
Rm Retired migrants HS 0.077 0.049 OECD data
Rn Retired migrants LS 0.353 0.085 OECD data
4.2 Sensitivity to diﬀerent speciﬁcations
In this section, we simulate a 1 percent increase in the labor force due to immigration under
four diﬀerent versions of the benchmark model described in Section 3. Our main goal is to
analyze the eﬀects of immigration on natives welfare, and to assess to what extent taking into
account natives endogenous skill and age composition matters in such analysis.15 To this end,
we compare the results obtained by the benchmark version of the model with those obtained in
models that diﬀer for the following elements: (a) the economy is composed of only working-age
individuals, i.e Ros ≡ 0 for each agent type (o, s) (henceforth referred as Model 2); (b) young
natives never adjust their skill in response to migration, i.e. γ is exogenous (henceforth referred
as Model 3); (c) there are no retirees in the economy and young natives never adjust their skill,
i.e. Ros ≡ 0 and γ is exogenous (henceforth referred as Model 4).
Since many developed countries are moving towards more selective migration policies in order
to attract highly educated workers, and the skill composition of the migration ﬂows plays a key
role for determining welfare eﬀects (Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012), in the analysis we
consider three diﬀerent types of one-oﬀ migration shocks: (i) a shock of low-skilled immigrant
workers (Qml); (ii) a shock of high-skilled immigrant workers (Qmh); (iii) a shock of low- and
high-skilled immigrant workers such that the immigrant skill composition does not change in
the post-shock scenario. Henceforth we will refer to this latter scenario as the "skill-balanced"
migration shock.
15Battisti et al. (2018) simulate a shock of the same magnitude.
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Moreover, as the impact of immigration on native welfare crucially depends on how the new
inﬂux of foreign-born workers aﬀect the labor market and the ﬁscal balance of the domestic
economy, we also analyze three main channels through which migration impacts native welfare:
the average labor income of native workers (wn ≡
∑
s
Enswns/
∑
s
Ens), the native unemployment
rate (un ≡
∑
s
Uns/
∑
s
Qns), and the ﬁscal eﬀect on the income tax rate (τ).
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4.2.1 The eﬀects of low-skilled immigration
Figure 2 shows the eﬀect of low-skilled immigration on the labor market, ﬁscal balance and
native welfare of the 19 selected OECD countries.
Under the benchmark version of the model, 8 out of 19 countries experience a decrease in
native unemployment rate (see Figure 2a). A similar result is obtained for Model 3, whereas
Model 2 and Model 4 ﬁnd a decrease in the native unemployment rate only for Belgium. More-
over, native wages positively respond to low-skilled immigration under all speciﬁcations, but
the benchmark model and Model 2 are noticeably more optimistic than the other models (see
Figure 2b). This underlines the importance of taking into account natives skill acquisition: in
the long-run, young natives decide to upgrade their skill and invest more in education in order
to avoid the ﬁercer competition of the new inﬂux of low-skilled migrants. As a consequence, in
models with endogenous native skill a higher share of natives will be high-skilled in the post-
shock scenario, making average wages raise and, on some countries, native unemployment rates
decrease.17
As far as the ﬁscal impact is concerned, Figure 2c shows that the benchmark model is more
optimistic than the others on all countries but Belgium. In particular, low-skilled immigration
has a positive eﬀect on government income in in 9 countries out of 19 under the benchmark
model. Model 4 is the more pessimistic, as it ﬁnds a positive ﬁscal impact only for Belgium,
whereas Model 2 and Model 3 ﬁnd positive eﬀects for 4 and 7 countries, respectively. This
underlines that including both endogenous skill acquisition and age composition matters for
assessing the ﬁscal impact of low-skilled immigration.
These results lead to an average native welfare eﬀect which is positive only for a sub-group
of OECD countries (see Figure 2d). Under the benchmark model, the average native welfare
increases for 9 out of the 19 OECD countries. Table 3 shows average results for the aggregate
group of the 19 selected OECD countries, weighted for their native population size (which
includes retirees for the benchmark model and Model 3, but only working-age active natives
for Model 2 and Model 4) in order to account for the diﬀerences in country size. Interestingly,
Model 2 turns out to be the more optimistic model when assessing the native welfare average
eﬀect of the whole group of countries, though the benchmark model is still less pessimistic than
Model 3 and Model 4.
16As described in Section 3, the tax rate on labor income τ is assumed to always adjust to balance the
government budget (21). This implies that, after a shock, if the domestic economy experiences an increase in
income (expenditures), the government will set a lower (higher) tax rate until its budget balances again.
17Note that, as pointed out in Battisti et al. (2018), it is possible for unemployment rates to decrease after
immigration, as ﬁrms may increase their proﬁt after the shock and open more vacancies for both native and
immigrant workers.
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Figure 2: Eﬀects of low-skilled immigration (1% of the total labor force) on 19 selected OECD countries
(a) Eﬀect on avg. native unemployment rate
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Note: Solid lines represent the benchmark model, whereas square-dotted, short-dashed and long-dashed lines represent Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4, respectively.
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Table 3: Weighted average eﬀects of low-skilled immigration
Variable Benchmark Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
un 0.193 0.173 0.327 0.248
wn 0.173 0.175 0.052 0.048
τ 0.2 0.603 0.373 0.702
Wn -0.064 -0.044 -0.127 -0.108
Note: all values indicate variations in percentage points. Each country is weighted according to its
native population size. Appendix B provides results for unweighted averages.
4.2.2 The eﬀects of high-skilled immigration
The steady-state variations of increasing the number of high-skilled immigrant by 1 percent of
the total labor force population over the 19 OECD countries are illustrated in Figure 3.
Regarding the eﬀects on the labor market outcomes, simulations of high-skilled immigration
yield contrastant results that depend on the assumption on natives skill acquisition. In models
in which natives skill acquisition is exogenous (Model 3 and Model 4), the higher competition in
the high-skill sector makes, on average, native unemployment rate to slightly increase, though
native wage rates increase as well (see Table 4). On the contrary, in models in which young
natives are allowed to endogenously adjust their skill (Benchmark and Model 2), young natives
avoid the increasing competition in the high-skill sector by supplying low-skill labor. As a result,
native unemployment rates, on average, decrease (Figure 3a shows that native unemployment
rate decreases in all countries but Belgium, Denmark and Sweden for the benchmark model),
but at the expense of average lower wage rates as, after the shock, more native people are now
working in the low-skilled sector, which pays for a lower wage rate.
Figure 3c shows that when age composition is taken into account, the labor income tax
rate decreases in almost all countries. In particular, under the benchmark model, high-skilled
immigration has positive ﬁscal eﬀects for all countries but Belgium and Denmark. Simula-
tions on Model 2 and Model 4 produce similar results, which ﬁnd an average negative eﬀect
of high-skilled migration on the domestic country ﬁscal balance. These results underline that
endogenizing skill acquisition does not noticeably aﬀect the ﬁscal impact of immigration on the
OECD countries, whereas age composition plays a bigger role on assessing the ﬁscal eﬀect of
high-skilled immigration.
Native welfare eﬀects are depicted in Figure 3d. The simulations yield positive native welfare
impacts on most countries under all model variations. Interestengly, Model 3 is found to be the
more optimistic model, underlining the fact that, when age composition is considered, high-
skilled immigrants greatly alleviate the ﬁscal burden in the host country. Conversely, Model 2
and Model 4, which do not account for age composition, are the least optimistic. Finally, The
benchmark model ﬁnds positive native welfare eﬀect on all countries but Belgium and Denmark,
which are the same countries for which simulations generate negative labor market outcomes in
the post-shock scenario.
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Figure 3: Eﬀects of high-skilled immigration (1% of the total labor force) on 19 selected OECD countries
(a) Eﬀect on avg. native unemployment rate
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Note: Solid lines represent the benchmark model, whereas square-dotted, short-dashed and long-dashed lines represent Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4, respectively.
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Table 4: Weighted average eﬀects of high-skilled immigration
Variable Benchmark Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
un -0.451 0.029 -0.601 0.104
wn -0.122 -0.138 0.029 0.054
τ -0.794 0.191 -1.006 0.031
Wn 0.339 0.130 0.401 0.217
Note: all values indicate variations in percentage points. Each country is weighted according to its
native population size. Appendix B provides results for unweighted averages.
4.2.3 The eﬀects of skill-balanced immigration
Figure 4 provides our simulation results on an increase in the stock of young immigrants by 1
percent of the total labor force, holding constant their actual education composition.
The benchmark model is the most optimistic model version for assessing the eﬀect of skill-
balanced migration on labor market outcomes. The native unemployment rate decreases in 12
out of 19 countries after the migration shock under the benchmark model. The other model
variations ﬁnd less optimistic results (see Figure 4a). In particular, Model 4 predicts a decrease
in native unemployment rate only for 6 out of 19 countries. As far as labor income is concerned,
native wages are found to increase for all countries under all of the four model versions, but
slightly more when taking into account natives endogenous skill acquisition (see Figure 4b).
Figure 4c shows results for the ﬁscal eﬀects of immigration over the 19 OECD countries. The
benchmark model and Model 3 are found to be more optimistic than the other model versions for
all countries but Belgium. In particular, 14 out of 19 countries experience a positive ﬁscal eﬀect
for the benchmark model and Model 3, while only 6 out of 19 countries experience positive ﬁscal
eﬀects under Model 2 and Model 4 after the skill-balanced immigration shock. This is coherent
with the previous ﬁnding that taking into account age skill composition positively changes the
ﬁscal impact of immigration on the domestic economy.
Because of a more positive labor outcome and ﬁscal impact, the benchmark model turns out
to be the model version that predicts the highest increase in average native welfare when a skill-
balanced immigration shock takes place in the considered OECD countries (see Table 5). As
shown in Figure 4d, the average native welfare increases in all countries but Belgium, Denmark,
France and Sweden under the benchmark model. The least optimistic version is Model 4, in
which natives skill composition is exogenous and retirees are not accounted for, that predicts an
increase in average native welfare for 13 of the considered 19 OECD countries.
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Figure 4: Eﬀects of skill-balanced immigration (1% of the total labor force) on 19 selected OECD countries
(a) Eﬀect on avg. native unemployment rate
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Note: Solid lines represent the benchmark model, whereas square-dotted, short-dashed and long-dashed lines represent Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4, respectively.
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Table 5: Weighted average eﬀects of skill-balanced immigration
Variable Benchmark Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
un -0.022 0.117 0.019 0.126
wn 0.072 0.067 0.045 0.05
τ -0.133 0.454 -0.088 0.461
Wn 0.07 0.018 0.048 0.006
Note: all values indicate variations in percentage points. Each country is weighted according to its
native population size. Appendix B provides results for unweighted averages.
4.3 Sensitivity to parameters
As there is empirical disagreement on the degree of substitutability between workers of diﬀerent
skill and origin (see Borjas et al., 2012) and these parameters play a key role for correctly
assessing the impact of migration on the host country labor market, here we perform a ceteris
paribus sensitivity analysis on the elasticities of substitution between high- and low- skilled
workers, σ1, and between native and immigrant workers, σ2. In the benchmark parametrization,
following Ottaviano and Peri (2012), we chose σ1 = 2 and σ2 = 20. In what follows, we set
σ1 = 1.5 and σ2 = 10000 to check how robust our benchmark model is when high- and low- skilled
workers are more complementary, and when native and immigrant workers can be considered as
perfect substitutes (i.e. σ2 → ∞). We vary each parameter each time and perform the same
skill-biased and skill-balanced immigration shocks we have discussed in the previous sections.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 illustrate the sensitivity of the immigration eﬀects on labor market out-
comes, labor income tax and average native welfare, under diﬀerent calibrations of the benchmark
model.
Let us start by considering the low-skilled immigration shock scenario (Figure 5). The
unemployment rate is mostly insensitive to diﬀerent parametrizations of σ1 and σ2 (see Figure
5a), with only Belgium and Portugal noticeably diﬀering in the magnitude of eﬀects, though not
in the direction of the eﬀects. Conversely, wage impacts are the ones that vary the most across
diﬀerent calibration (see Figure 5b), as σ1 and σ2 directly aﬀect workers marginal productivity,
and hence their wages. That being said, the countries ranking is mostly unaﬀected and the
immigration eﬀect on native wages is consistently positive even when the elasticity of substitution
between immigrant and native workers tends to inﬁnity. Results on the ﬁscal and native welfare
impact are also rather robust (see Panels 5c and 5d), though calibrating σ2 = 10000 yields,
on average, slightly more pessimistic results, while setting σ1 = 1.5 produces slightly more
optimistic welfare gains.
Let us now focus on the case in which the immigration shock is entirely characterized by
high-skilled workers (Figure 6). The resulting eﬀect of high-skilled immigration on the native un-
employment rate is highly robust under diﬀerent calibration choices of the elasticity parameters
(see Figure 6a). Native wages eﬀects vary across diﬀerent parametrizations, with the benchmark
one yielding the most optimistic results (see Figure 6b). However, despite the diﬀerence in mag-
nitudes eﬀect and countries rankings, under all parametrizations we ﬁnd a decrease in average
native wage in response to high-skilled immigration. Fiscal and Welfare eﬀects are found to be
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of low-skilled immigration (1% of the total labor force) on 19 selected OECD countries - Sensitivity to parameters
(a) Eﬀect on avg. native unemployment rate
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Note: Solid lines represent the benchmark parametrization, square-dotted lines indicates parametrization of σ1 = 10000, dashed lines indicates parametrization of σ2 = 1.5.
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Figure 6: Eﬀects of high-skilled immigration (1% of the total labor force) on 19 selected OECD countries - Sensitivity to parameters
(a) Eﬀect on avg. native unemployment rate
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Note: Solid lines represent the benchmark parametrization, square-dotted lines indicates parametrization of σ1 = 10000, dashed lines indicates parametrization of σ2 = 1.5.
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Figure 7: Eﬀects of skill-balanced immigration (1% of the total labor force) on 19 selected OECD countries - Sensitivity to parameters
(a) Eﬀect on avg. native unemployment rate
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Note: Solid lines represent the benchmark parametrization, square-dotted lines indicates parametrization of σ1 = 10000, dashed lines indicates parametrization of σ2 = 1.5.
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highly robust, with only Portugal and Spain noticeably varying across diﬀerent parametrization
choices (see Panels 6c and 6d).
Finally, we analyze how robust are our results in the case of a skill-balanced immigration
shock (Figure 7). While native unemployment rate eﬀects are highly robust in all countries
but Portugal (see Figure 7a), native wages variations are sensible to the parametrization of
the elasticity of substitution between migrant and native workers, σ2 (see Figure 7b). Indeed,
despite the countries ranking is mostly the same, the magnitude of the eﬀects vary, so that when
σ2 tends to inﬁnity, 5 out of 19 countries experience a negative native wage rate, whereas in
the benchmark parametrization the native wages increase in all countries after the skill-balanced
migration shock. As far as ﬁscal and welfare eﬀects are concerned (Panels 7c and 7d), diﬀerences
among diﬀerent parametrizations are present but limited. In particular, setting σ2 = 10000 we
ﬁnd that average native welfare decreases in 8 out of 19 countries, whereas in the benchmark
parametrization it decreases in only 4 countries.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the eﬀects of immigration on the native welfare, by introducing two key
features that have been so far mostly neglected in the growing literature of search models. The
ﬁrst feature is related to the recent empirical ﬁndings that natives tend to adjust their task spe-
cialization in response to immigration. The second feature regards individuals age composition,
and allows us to assess whether immigrant workers are able to alleviate the ﬁscal burden of aging
populations. Both of these features are taken into account in our search model by endogenizing
natives education decisions and by including diﬀerent generations of workers. We focus our
analysis on a selected group of 19 OECD countries (EU15 member states, Australia, Canada,
Switzerland and USA) and perform a comparative statics analysis under diﬀerent variations of
immigration shocks and model versions in order to assess to what extent the introduced features
aﬀect welfare results.
Despite the heterogeneity in population and labor market characteristics across countries, our
analysis ﬁnds the following results for the aggregate group of OECD countries considered. First,
when young natives endogenously decide their education investment, natives are successfully
able to avoid any displacement eﬀect that a migration shock may generate. The only exception
is for the case in which the migration shock consists of only low-skilled immigrants which, on
average, generates a slight displacement eﬀect. This latter negative eﬀect is, however, oﬀset
by the increase on average native wages that takes place in all of the considered 19 countries.
Second, migration inﬂuxes that include high-skilled workers have positive ﬁscal eﬀects when age
composition is taken into account. On the contrary, the other model versions that abstract from
retired workers ﬁnd negative ﬁscal eﬀects under all immigration shock scenarios. Third, the
features introduced in our benchmark model allow for an overall more optimistic prediction of
the impact of immigration on natives' welfare. In particular, according to our benchmark model
simulation, average native welfare increases in all countries but Belgium, Denmark, France and
Sweden in response to a immigration shock that doesn't aﬀect the observed immigrants education
composition. However, these results change when the inﬂux of migration is composed of only
low-skilled workers, as only 9 of the analyzed 19 countries experience an increase in average
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welfare after the shock. Our results are mostly robust to sensitivity analysis on diﬀerent degrees
of substitution between workers of diﬀerent skill and origin.
Our paper departs from a search model inspired by Battisti et al. (2018), in which we intro-
duced intergenerational features. However, our analysis can still be extended to address several
issues for future research. For example, one signiﬁcant issue to be pursued in future work may
be to allow for immigrants assimilation. Indeed, our model accounts for population dynamics
regarding skill and age composition, but totally abstracts from immigrants assimilation. Long-
term immigrants, and especially their oﬀspring, may successfully integrate in the host country
and eventually be considered the same as native workers under all respects.
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Appendix
A Group-speciﬁc welfare eﬀects
Figure 8: Immigration eﬀect on avg. migrant welfare
(a) Low-skilled immigration eﬀect on migrants welfare
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Note: we use the following average immigrant welfare index
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Figure 9: Group-speciﬁc eﬀects of low-skilled immigration (1% of the total labor force)
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-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
Benchmark Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(b) Low-skilled natives welfare
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
Benchmark Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(c) High-skilled immigrants welfare
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
Benchmark Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(d) Low-skilled immigrants welfare
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Benchmark Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Note: we use the welfare index Wnh ≡ EnhJ
E
nh+UnhJUnh− z
∗
2
Qnh+RnhJRnh
(Qnh+Rnh)
for native high-skilled; we use Wos ≡ EosJ
E
os+UosJUos+RosJRos
(Qos+Ros)
otherwise.
28
Figure 10: Group-speciﬁc eﬀects of high-skilled immigration (1% of the total labor force)
(a) High-skilled natives welfare
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Figure 11: Group-speciﬁc eﬀects of low-skilled immigration (1% of the total labor force)
(a) High-skilled natives welfare
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B Unweighted average eﬀects of immigration
Figure 12: Unweighted average eﬀects of immigration immigration (1% of the total labor force) on 19 selected OECD countries
(a) Eﬀect on avg. native unemployment rate
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